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Must replication attempts be battlegrounds? 
 
Publishing failed replications can be like throwing down the academic gauntlet: we enter into a 
combative narrative, where either the original study’s finding was “false” or “unreliable”, or the 
replicators did a poor job, having missed a crucial methodological detail, sampled their participants 
differently, or so on. This combative approach towards replications is evident in the article by Huber, 
Potter, and Huszar (2018), who argue that reviewers of a replication must necessarily be different 
from the original authors of a study. One can appreciate that having an original study author 
amongst the reviewers may lead to hostile reviews that halt publication, if the replication has not 
produced the desired result. Of course, this problem does not just apply to replications, but to all 
studies that pose a threat to a researcher’s pet-theory, or a shining publication. As scientists, we are 
supposed to take an objective approach to data, not allowing biases or vested interests in particular 
theories or papers to cloud our judgement. It follows that discussion about conflicting findings 
should be constructive, not destructive. Blocking the publication of a “failed” replication of one’s 
own work is obviously not aiding scientific progress, but I am not convinced that banning original 
authors from the chance to review, comment on, or contribute to replication attempts is 
constructive either. 
Indeed, while clearly Huber et al.’s (2018) experience having the original study authors as 
reviewers on their replication was negative, this is not the case for all. In a recent discussion of their 
experiences doing a registered report (Chambers, 2016; for the report see Ratner, Burrow, and 
Thoemmes, 2016), a different group of authors note the positives of having one of the original 
study’s authors as a reviewer of their replication. These are two very different experiences: Huber 
and colleagues battled with their reviewer, while Ratner et al. (2016) entered into a collaborative 
enterprise with theirs. Arguably the publication format of a registered report may offer a protective 
environment for those conducting a replication; the original authors have the chance to point out 
any methodological differences to their original paper prior to data collection, and rejection of final 
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papers after the final results are known is not allowable if reviewers have agreed in advance that the 
methods are sound. 
Replications (or more broadly studies that challenge previous results or theories) do not 
have to be battlegrounds, and frameworks exist to help scaffold more cooperative working. One 
such framework is “adversarial collaboration”: intentional partnerships between research groups 
who have different predictions for the data. These inter-group arrangements were recently 
discussed as a potential solution to poor reproducibility resulting from scientists’ own biases 
towards their data (Nuzzo, 2015; though these ideas are not particularly new; see Kahneman, 2003). 
In theory, projects arising from these collaborations may be more likely to be designed in such as a 
way as to actively test competing hypotheses. In addition to more rigorous designs, intentionally 
including rivals’ inputs should allay some of the “story-telling” Huber et al. (2018) decry: having 
multiple perspectives dilutes the “just-so” story being told, as now there are multiple competing 
stories that will need to be weighed objectively in the project’s final reports. 
In the field of neuroscience, adversarial collaborations appear to have been rarely entered 
into. One potential reason for this could be a lack of strong theoretical frameworks in neuroscience 
(as discussed in Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, MacIver, & Poeppel, 2017), as the adversarial 
collaborative model relies on the presence of competing hypotheses generated from theory. 
Examples of adversarial collaborations can be found in cognitive science; the example that is oft 
cited is that by Mellers, Hertwig, and Kahneman (2001), which contains broad tips for establishing 
and conducting an adversarial collaboration. Another recent example in cognitive science of such an 
arrangement is the study by Matzeke et al (2015).  
Undoubtedly these arrangements require careful planning and sensitive diplomacy, and 
sometimes may be impossible to set up, but wider adoption of this practice has much to offer the 
field of neuroscience. To promote such models of working, some incentives and support structures 
will be necessary: these could include special issues that explicitly invite adversarial collaborations 
for publication, or research funding set aside for proposed adversarial collaborations to apply for. 
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Prompting neuroscientists to approach their work in this way may also encourage stronger 
theorizing with more explicit linkage of neuroscientific experiments to cognitive theories, linkage 
that has been argued to underpin most significant advances in understanding of neural basis of 
behaviour (Frank & Badre, 2015). 
In conjunction with the explicit division between confirmatory and exploratory research, as 
outlined by Huber et al. (2018), I propose a wider move towards these collaborative frameworks. 
These arrangements actually lend themselves well to preregistration, given that clear and formalised 
predictions are required to be agreed upon by all parties in the collaboration. Indeed, we can expect 
to see a preregistered, adversarial collaboration published in Cortex very soon (Sassenhagen et al., in 
principle acceptance).  
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